Intrusion of contaminants into water distribution networks requires the simultaneous presence of three elements; contamination source, pathway and driving force. The existence of each of these elements provides 'partial' evidence (typically incomplete and non-specific) to the occurrence of contaminant intrusion into distribution networks. Evidential reasoning, also called Dempster-Shafer (DS) theory, has proved useful to incorporate both aleatory and epistemic uncertainties in the inference mechanism. The application of evidential reasoning to assess risk of contaminant intrusion is demonstrated with the help of an example of a single pipe. The proposed approach can be extended to full-scale water distribution network to establish risk-contours of contaminant intrusion. Risk-contours using GIS may help utilities to identify sensitive locations in the water distribution network and prioritize control and preventive strategies.
INTRODUCTION
Water quality in a distribution network can be described by specific microbiological, physicochemical and aesthetic attributes of water. These attributes are generally maintained in a desirable range, predefined by upper and/or lower limits. Each water quality attribute encompasses a number of water quality indicators. The overall acceptability of water quality for its intended use depends on the magnitude of these indicators and is often governed by regulations and guidelines. A water quality failure is defined as a violation of regulations (or guidelines or self imposed limits) of one or more water quality indicators (Sadiq et al. 2004) .
Five mechanisms/pathways can lead to water quality failures namely intrusion, regrowth, breakthrough, internal corrosion / leaching and permeation. Of the five, four mechanisms (breakthrough is the exception), are directly affected by pipes, either through pipe material type, size, structural condition, hydraulic / operational conditions and/or inner surface degradation. Table 1 shows a relative frequency of deficiencies attributed to the outbreaks of illness that were traced to the distribution network (Lindley 2001, Lindley and Buchberger 2002) . Environmental conditions such as the quality of the raw water, temperature and soil conditions around pipes can also have a direct or indirect impact on fluctuations of water quality in distribution networks (Kirmeyer et al. 2001 ).
The deterioration of pipe structural integrity can have a multi-faceted impact on water quality, especially in the domain of contaminant intrusion. Frequent pipe breaks increase the possibility of intrusion through the compromised sections in several ways. During repairs, intrusion can occur if flushing and local disinfection procedures are not appropriately followed. Furthermore, pipes are de-pressurized in the vicinity of a break during repair. This low pressure increases the potential of contaminant intrusion through unprotected cross connections. If the pipe has holes then de-pressurization will increase the likelihood of contaminant intrusion, which can be especially detrimental if the surrounding soil is contaminated by leaky sewers nearby, chemical spills, herbicides, pesticides, etc.
Data fusion refers to the scientific aggregation of information available in the form of observations and/or measurements. In some cases, different data sets give complementary information on various aspects of an event. In these cases there is motivation to collect additional information to increase the accuracy of the prediction. Information can also be redundant if it deals with the same aspect of the problem. Redundancy can improve the reliability of the prediction as measurement(s) / observation(s) are confirmed by the redundant one. Complementary and redundant information in data sets are the basis of data fusion applications in water quality modelling.
Quantitative aggregation of 'incomplete', 'uncertain' and 'imprecise' (vague) information / data warrants the use of soft computing methods, which are tolerant to imprecision, uncertainties and partial truths (Zadeh 1984) . The term soft computing comprises an array of heuristic techniques such as fuzzy logic, evidential reasoning, neural networks, and genetic algorithms, which essentially provide rational solutions for complex real-world problems (Bonissone 1997) . A traditional soft computing method for data fusion is the Bayesian (subjectivist) probability approach, which cannot differentiate between aleatory and epistemic uncertainties and is unable to handle non-specific, ambiguous and conflicting information without making strong assumptions. These limitations can be addressed by the application of Dempster-Shafer (DS) theory or the evidence theory. Evidential reasoning based on DS theory is named after Dempster (1967) and Shafer (1976) and is a generalization of the Bayesian theory. The DS theory was found to be flexible enough to combine the rigor of probability theory with the flexibility of rule-based systems. The DS theory applications in civil and environmental engineering range from slope stability (Binaghi et al. 1998) , environmental decision-making (Attoh-Okine and Gibbons 2001), seismic analysis (Alim 1988) , failure detection (Tanaka and Klir 1999) , construction management (Sönmez et al. 2002) , water quality (Sadiq and Rodriguez 2005) to climate change (Luo and Caselton 1997) . Many more applications of DS theory can be seen in the detailed bibliography provided by Sentz and Ferson (2002) . This paper presents an innovative approach that uses evidential reasoning (DS theory) to quantify the risk of contaminant intrusion at a given location in a water distribution network.
However, the proposed approach can be extended to full-scale water distribution network, which will help to establish risk-contours of contaminant intrusion using GIS. The riskcontours may help utilities to identify sensitive locations in the water distribution networks and prioritize their rehabilitation and control strategies.
The remaining paper is organised as follows: next section provides an introduction to the mechanism of contaminant intrusion in distribution water mains. The background and formulation of evidence theory is presented in the following section. It is then followed by an application of evidential reasoning to contaminant intrusion in the distribution network.
Finally, a summary section concludes the paper.
Intrusion of contaminants (hitherto referred to simply as "intrusion") into the water distribution network can occur through pipes and storage tanks (animals, dust-carrying bacteria, infiltration). Intrusion through deteriorated water mains can occur during maintenance and repair events, through broken pipes and gaskets, and cross-connections. Kirmeyer et al. (2001) ranked pathogen (contaminant) entry routes into the distribution network based on responses from an expert panel, the members of which were instructed to identify and rank the importance of routes of entry. Results are summarised in Table 2, indicating that intrusion was rated mostly "high". In addition to pathogens, intrusion can also introduce into the pipe chemicals, such as pesticides, herbicides, hydrocarbons (gasoline spills) as well as physical contaminants, such as plant debris and soil particles. Intrusion into water mains requires the simultaneous presence of three elements, a pathway, driving force (negative pressure differential between the pipe and its environment) and a contamination source. Brief description of these elements is provided in following sub-sections.
Pipe breakage / repair and cross-connection -a pathway
A water distribution network can never be completely water tight due to the existence of pipe cracks, holes, faulty gaskets and/or faulty appurtenances, which can serve as intrusion pathways. The driving force required for intrusion is usually a pressure differential. Therefore, it is improbable that intrusion will occur as long as the water pressure inside the network is greater than the pressure outside although movement of microbial or viral contaminants against the pressure gradient is possible. Pressure differential can occur during maintenance activities, such as during break repairs, flushing, etc., when parts of the distribution network are de-pressurized. Sources of contaminants include sewage water ex-filtrated from adjacent broken sewers, contaminated groundwater/soil and backflow through unprotected crossconnections.
Another direct pathway of intrusion is the actual exposure of a broken pipe to contaminated soil or water during repair. Contamination may occur if proper flushing and disinfection procedures are not implemented prior to re-commissioning. Clearly, the frequency of pipe breakage, the duration of repair jobs and the size of the network segment that can be isolated during maintenance are factors that have an impact on the risk of intrusion.
Cross-connection is a term used to describe a physical link through which it is possible for a non-potable liquid to enter into a potable water distribution network. Typically, when the pressure in the non-potable system is greater than that in the water distribution network, the existence of an unprotected cross-connection may result in the backflow of contaminants into the potable water supply system. One of the most severe cases of contamination attributed to cross-connection was recorded in Chicago in 1933 where 1,409 persons contracted amoebic dysentery of which 98 died (Anderson 1981) . Since then, increased knowledge and awareness, extensive regulation and technical advances have reduced the risk of contamination through cross-connections but have not eliminated it completely.
Transient pressures -driving force
In addition to pressure differentials arising due to de-pressurisation of pipes, as discussed earlier, extreme transient pressures can also cause pressure differentials. Extreme transient pressures in a water supply system can occur as a result of power failure in a pumping station, fast closure of valves, fire flows, pipe rupture, etc. These transients can cause negative pressures in pipes, which sometimes may be exacerbated by peculiar topographical conditions. These negative pressures may provide a driving force for contaminants to intrude through compromised pipe walls and joint gaskets. Extreme transient pressures are more likely to occur in long transmission mains than in an urban distribution network in which users' faucets effectively serve as widely distributed pressure relief valves. An exception may be during fire flows or in the vicinity of a wet industrial facility. The volume of the inflow of the contaminated solute is typically quite small (less that 1% of the flow in the pipe) since the duration of transient pressures is quite short (Kirmeyer et al. 2001 ).
Sources of contamination
Contamination sources can be either chemical (pesticides, herbicides, petroleum products, fertilizers, solvents, detergents, pharmaceuticals, etc.) or microbiological (microbes, viruses, bacteria). Karim et al. (2003) reported concentrations of total coliform, fecal coliform, clostridium, bacillus, and viruses in soil and water samples taken around the water mains.
Total and fecal coliforms were found in more than 60% and 40% of the samples, respectively.
Bacillus was found in most of the samples as was expected because it is a natural soil organism. Enteroviruses, Norwalk and Hepatitis A viruses were also found around the pipe giving a strong indication of human and animal sources of contamination. Karim et al. (2003) also reported the range of concentrations for various organisms found in soil samples collected in the vicinity of the water mains.
Intrusion is a complex phenomenon, which depends on above three elements but generally the data on these elements are incomplete, non-specific and uncertain. Evidential reasoning provides a meaningful way to fuse / aggregate these data to make inferences on the risk of contaminant intrusion. The next section provides a background to DS theory and its possible application to assess the risk of contaminant intrusion in distribution networks.
EVIDENCE THEORY
Two major types of uncertainties, aleatory (natural heterogeneity and stochasticity) and epistemic (subjectivity, ignorance) are observed in natural systems. The traditional approach to handle aleatory uncertainty is through probabilistic analysis based on historical data (a frequentist approach). Traditionally, epistemic uncertainty has been addressed through Bayesian approach, however, the approach has limitations, since it requires a-priori assumptions (Sentz and Ferson 2002) .
Consider a case of water quality deterioration in distribution network due to intrusion, where possible outcomes (water quality condition states) are low, medium and high denoted by {L}, {M}, and {H}, respectively. The traditional Bayesian approach treats these outcomes only as disjoint bodies of evidence, i.e., probabilities can be assigned to only singletons {L}, {M}, and {H}. Further, according to the basic axiom of probability, p(L) + p(M) + p(H) = 1.
Consequently, the probability of the complement of {L}, i.e., p(¬L) = 1 -p(L) = p(M) + p(H). The inference about p(¬L) is based on a rather strong assumption, i.e., the Principle of Insufficient Reason (Sentz and Ferson 2002) that ignorance has to be distributed uniformly among the remaining singletons {M} and {H}. For example, if observation of water quality implies that p(L) = 0.5 and no further information is available, then p(M) = p(H) = 0.25 is assumed due to Principle of Insufficient Reason.
The DS theory can be interpreted as a generalization of the Bayesian approach, where probabilities are assigned to subsets and not only to mutually exclusive singletons (Sentz and Ferson 2002) . For example, in the above case, in addition to singletons {L}, {M}, {H}, subsets of outcome (with less specificity) such as {L, M} (read: L or M), {M, H}, {L, H} and {L, M, H} are also considered as candidates for a basic probability assignment (bpa, this concept is detailed in the next section). The Bayesian approach could therefore be viewed as a special case of DS theory, where sufficient evidence exists to assign probability to singletons only (highly specific situations) and ignore less specific subsets. Therefore, the Bayesian approach is unable to differentiate both aleatory and epistemic uncertainties efficiently and cannot handle less specific and ambiguous evidences. The evidential reasoning (or theory of evidence) addresses these issues effectively. In the above example instead of assigning p(M) = p(H) = 0.25, the remaining probability will be acknowledged as ignorance (epistemic uncertainty) and will be dealt with using DS theory.
Basic concepts
In DS theory, the frame of discernment Θ is defined as a set of mutually exclusive alternatives, which allows the power set "A" to have a total of 2 ⏐Θ⏐ subsets in the domain, where ⏐Θ⏐is the cardinality of the frame of discernment. For example, if the frame of discernment Θ = {L, M, H}, its power set comprises 8 subsets (the cardinality is 3), due to closed world assumption over "union" (i.e., the possible outcomes are exhaustive and can not be outside the frame of discernment). This power set A contains the 8 subsets A i (i = 1, 2, …, 8), i.e., φ (a null set), {L}, {M}, {H}, {L, M}, {M, H}, {L, H}, and {L, M, H}. Thus, depending on the evidence, probability mass (also referred to as bpa) can be assigned to low, medium, high, low or medium, low or high, medium or high, and low or medium or high (the last subset denotes a fully ignorant situation). Recall that this concept is different from the Bayesian approach in which there are only three possible outcomes on this frame of discernment Θ, which are {L}, {M} and {H}. Four important concepts, namely, basic probability assignment (m or bpa), belief (bel), plausibility (pl) and pignistic probability (bet) functions are used in DS theory.
The basic probability assignment (bpa or m) expresses the proportion of all available relevant evidence that supports the claim that a particular element of power set A belongs to the (sub)set A i but to no particular subset of A i (Klir 1995; Klir and Folger 1988) . The basic probability assignment is used to determine the two non-additive measures belief and plausibility, which represent the lower and upper bounds of a probability, respectively.
The lower bound, belief (bel), for a set A i is defined as the sum of all the basic probability assignments of the proper subsets A k of the set of interest A i , i.e., A k ⊆ A i . The general relation between bpa and belief can be written as
It can be shown that
because DS theory allows some mass to be assigned to less specific subset m(L, M), which was not permitted in Bayesian approach.
Therefore, DS theory relaxes a strong additivity constraint of probability theory to more relaxed constraint of monotonicity.
The belief functions for above example are given by
The upper probability bound, plausibility, is the summation of basic probability assignment of the sets A k that intersect with the set of interest A i , i.e., A k ∩ A i ≠ φ, and therefore it can be written as
In addition, the following relationships for belief and plausibility functions hold true in all
In our example, the plausibility functions are given by
The belief interval (I) is an interval between belief and plausibility representing a range in which true probability may lie, therefore a narrow belief interval represents more precise probabilities, and it can be shown that the probability is uniquely determined if bel(A i ) = pl(A i ) (note that probability theory is applicable only where all probabilities are unique and disjoint Beliefs manifest themselves at two levels -the credal level (from credibility) where belief is entertained, and the pignistic level where beliefs are used to make decisions. The term "pignistic" was proposed by Smets (2000) and originates from the word pignus, meaning 'bet' in Latin. Pignistic probability is used for decision-making and uses Principle of Insufficient
Reason to derive from basic probability assignment. It is a point (crisp) estimate in a belief interval and can be determined as
The denominator |A k | in the above equation represents the cardinality (number of elements) of the (sub)set A k . The pignistic probabilities in our example are
The sum of pignistic probabilities is always 1.
Dempster-Shafer (DS) rule of combination
The purpose of data fusion/ aggregation is to summarize and simplify information in a rational manner. The DS theory assumes that the sources of information are independent. Alim (1988) described that the 'combined' (or 'fused') belief not only represents the total belief of a set A i and all of its subsets but also takes into account the contributions of different sources of evidence about A i . The DS inference uses combination operators that compromise on precision but require less information than the Bayesian inference (Sentz and Ferson 2002) .
The DS rule of combination strictly emphasizes agreement between multiple sources and ignores all conflicting evidence through normalization. A strict conjunctive logic through AND-type operator (product) is employed in the combination of evidence. So far, bpa was referred to as m for any body of evidence. Since two or more bodies of evidence are introduced in the subsequent discussion, the subscript j, i.e., m j , is introduced in reference to body of evidence j. The DS rule of combination for j = 1, 2 determines the joint m 1-2 from the aggregation of two basic probability assignments m 1 and m 2 by (Klir and Folger 1988) ( 2 1 2 1 ; and m 1-2 (φ) = 0 (7) where is the degree of conflict in two sources of evidence and Table 3 . The belief, plausibility and pignistic probability are determined using equations 2, 4 and 6 respectively for the combined evidence.
Combining sources of varying credibility
Equations (7) and (8) above implicitly assume that all sources of information are equally credible, but this may not always be the case. For example, sampling locations for monitoring water quality may be representative of a particular part of the water distribution network, e.g., if one sample is collected from major distribution main and the other is collected from a minor main, the influence zones of the two samples are different. Similarly, if the samples are collected at the same point when two different flow conditions prevail, the evidence of water quality also needs to be adjusted based on the flow conditions. Also, if water utility staff with different levels of expertise collects water samples, the observations may need to be adjusted based on their experience. Therefore, the bodies of evidence obtained from different sources of information need to be discounted using credibility factor (α) depending on its relative strength and/or reliability.
The evidence can be discounted as
The credibility factor is constrained by 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, where '0' represents 'fully incredible evidence', and '1' represents 'fully credible evidence'. The following section provides a simple hypothetical application of DS theory to determine the risk of contaminant intrusion in distribution network.
ESTIMATING RISK OF CONTAMINANT INTRUSION
The frame of discernment of risk of an intrusion can be described by a universal set Θ = {P, NP}, in which 'P' denotes 'possible' and NP denotes 'not-possible' intrusion. The power set of the risk of intrusion consists of two singletons {P} and, {NP}, a universal set {P, NP} and the empty set {φ}. As described earlier, the risk of intrusion of contaminants can be evaluated based on three bodies of evidence, a pathway (e 1 ), a driving force (e 2 ), and a contamination source (e 3 ).
In this example, the breakage rate (# of breaks/100 km/year) is taken as a surrogate measure for an intrusion pathway, transient pressure (psi) is taken as a surrogate for the existence of a driving force and the separation distance (meters) between a contaminant source and a water main as a surrogate measure for a source of contamination. We selected these surrogate measures due to simplicity in data collection. The frames of discernment for all three bodies of evidence are mapped to attain the basic probability assignments (i.e., m 1 , m 2 and m 3 ), where each of them is assigned to the subsets {P}, {P, NP}, and {NP} of universal set Θ risk of intrusion. This multi-valued mapping is performed using a plot similar to fuzzy sets. But, the overlap of subsets does not refer to vagueness (for which fuzzy sets are used) rather this overlap is more conceptual and represents ambiguity (Beynon 2005) . This multi-valued mapping makes sure that the sum of bpa (represented by y-axis) is "1" over the frame of discernment. It is not the basic requirement in case of fuzzy sets, which are represented by memberships on the y-axis. Suppose that three bodies of evidence m 1 , m 2 and m 3 are assigned credibility factors (α) of 0.7, 0.9 and 0.6, respectively. Therefore, after bpas, are estimated (from mapping) they are adjusted by credibility factors (using equation 9). For example, the credibility factor for contaminant source α 3 is 0.6, therefore the adjusted basic probability assignment is m α3 (P) = 0.6, m α3 (P, NP) = 0.4, and m α3 (NP) = 0.
Three bodies of evidence are combined using the DS rule of combination as described above.
The simplex plot is used to illustrate three dimensions (subsets) of risk of intrusion, i.e., {P}, {P, NP}, and {NP} as shown in Figure 2 . The simplex plot is an equilateral triangle in which, ant point is represented by three offsets measured from the axes opposite to vertices of a triangle. The sum of these perpendicular distances is always equal to 1 anywhere in the triangle. To see more details on simplex plots reader should refer to Marschak (1950 ), Walley (1991 , Denoeux (2000) and Beynon (2005) . For example, the vertex {P, NP} represents the ignorance; therefore any point closer to this vertex represents higher level of ignorance and ambiguity (because it has a maximum perpendicular distance from the opposite axis {NP}-{P, NP}). Points e 1 , e 2 and e 3 represent three bodies of evidence which are fused together using the DS rule of combination to obtain combined evidence (e c ) of (0.31, 0.21, 0.48) as shown in Figure 2 . The interpretation is that the belief of intrusion risk bel(P) is 31%, the corresponding plausibility pl(P) is 52%, and that there is 48% belief bel ( The belief interval can be converted into a crisp or point estimate bet(P) (also termed 'expected utility') of risk of intrusion. The pignistic transformation of the imprecise probabilities yields bet(P) = 0.41.
Five additional scenarios for the example in Figure 1 are examined (their details are provided in the table at the bottom of Figure 2 ). The pressure and intrusion pathways measures in scenario 2 remain unchanged from those in scenario 1, but the contaminant source is assumed to be at a distance of 20 m rather than 3 m from the water main. The belief is now reduces to zero but the plausibility is 0.3, which is due to low pressure at that node. However, if transient pressure is increased to 50 psi for scenario 3 (a normal operating pressure), the belief remains zero but the belief interval drops to [0, 0.03] . In scenario 4, the breakage rate is increased to very high rate of 30 breaks/100 km/year, belief remains the same (at zero) but plausibility increases to 0.1, making it a more uncertain event. The pignistic probability increases to 0.17 from 0.05 for scenario 5, where the sewer is very close (at 3 m) to the water main, and the breakage rate is very high. Scenario 6 corresponds to an extreme case (negative pressures, contaminant source very near and very high breakage rate) in which all bodies of evidence hint to a 'certain' intrusion and the ignorance is almost negligible.
These scenarios illustrate how the risk of intrusion can vary with variations in three bodies of evidence considered here. The suggested approach enables the determination of risk of contaminant intrusion even when available information is incomplete, ambiguous or qualitative in nature. This approach can help utilities to establish risk-contours of contaminant intrusion for their distribution network using GIS. The evidential reasoning methodology can be implemented and be viewed as two layers in GIS. First layer may represent the risk of contaminant intrusion using pignistic probabilities, whereas the second layer may show the confidence over those values using belief interval. The pipe segments with higher bet(P) are points of concern, however, pipes with lower bet(P) but larger belief intervals are also of concern.
SUMMARY
The intrusion of contaminants into water distribution networks requires the simultaneous presence of three elements, a pathway, a driving force and a contamination source. Each of these elements provides an independent body of evidence of the risk of 'intrusion' in the distribution network.
In this paper, evidence theory was introduced as an innovative methodology that can be used to simplify and improve the understanding and interpretation of data generated through routine water quality monitoring in distribution networks. Evidential reasoning, also called Dempster-Shafer (DS) theory, has proved effective in dealing with this type of situation.
Bodies of evidence representing, intrusion pathway(s), driving force(s), and contamination source(s) are mapped over a frame of discernment of intrusion risk. Subsequently the DS rule of combination is applied to make an inference on the occurrence of intrusion. The implementation of this evidential reasoning method to assess risk of intrusion in distribution network is described with the help of a simplex plot where vertices of an equilateral triangle represent potential for intrusion, not-intrusion and ignorance. Six scenarios were generated to demonstrate the application of the proposed method under varying conditions.
The proposed method will help to quantify the risk of contaminant intrusion in a given pipe.
However, the concept can be extended to water distribution network, which will help to establish risk-contours of contaminant intrusion. The risk-contours may help utilities to identify sensitive locations in the water distribution networks using GIS and prioritize control strategies. 
